A considerable amount of research supports the contention that between two thirds and three quarters of all change programmes fail in their own terms. In this paper I suggest that our inability to determine the future runs contrary to many assumptions about change management and that an amalgam of three particular theories of indeterminacy (constructivism, indeterminacy and complexity theory) -which I call subjunctivism -may help understand the problem.
Introduction: subjunctivismdetermining the indeterminate
Subjunctivism is an amalgam of several different categories of social theory: constructivism, complexity theory and indeterminacy that, in my opinion, and borrowing from Weber (1970) , have an elective affinity for each other. That is, they all have a foundational scepticism about the determinate nature of reality. For constructivists the nature and "effects" of people and things are indeterminate. For complexity theorists, the short term is indeterminate, irrespective of any longer term limits that limit the likely future. For the disparate group that I have called indeterminacy theorists, those in positions of power can never "determine", at least in any strong sense, the actions of their subordinates. Thus, all embody the notion of indeterminacy as a primary feature of their approaches. This indeterminacy mirrors a linguistic convention which we know as the subjunctivist verb mood. The subjunctivist mood implies that something other than what did happen could have happened, or that unless certain actions are taken something will follow. For example, in the sentence "If I were you I'd stop doing that", "were" is in the subjunctive mood. Similarly, one can develop historical counterfactual statements using the same subjunctive mood: "if only Hitler had been successful as a painter the world would be very different." Subjunctivism, therefore, remains sceptical about the patterning of historical events: "the Second World War was inevitable" is one such determinist assumption which subjunctivism denies. The three elements of theory produce what is, in effect, a counterfactual approach to change leadership. That is, they assert (as do the other main theories) that leaders can make a difference because events are not determined either by some mysterious religious or spiritual force, for example as Hegel believed; but they also imply that "reality" as we know it is not determined by structural forces of one form or another. In other words, that a more appropriate way of explaining the world is to use the subjunctive mood rather than the present or past mood: what could have been rather than what was or is. A subjunctive approach requires neither a "great leader" approach to explanation (Churchill was single-handedly responsible for the British surviving the war), nor Benjamin Franklin's maxim for Richard III, "for the want of nail" approach ("for the want of nail the shoe was lost, for the want of a shoe the horse was lost, for the want of a horse the rider was lost, for the want of a rider the battle was lost, for the want of the battle the kingdom was lost." In this "domino-fall" approach one small event determines the next so that catastrophes can be laid at the door of mundane events. However, although complexity theory's "butterfly effect" appears to have a similar chain reaction, in reality the pattern of events is limited by so called "strange attractors". We will come to this shortly. But at this stage, the point remains that the subjunctivist theory remains sceptical as to the determinate effects of anything and therefore retains a permanent question mark over the unfolding of events in change and the part played by leaders. Let me now sketch in a little more detail the other foundation stones of this subjunctivist approach.
Constructivism
Constructivism in its most radical formats, rejects the notion of essences entirely (see Grint and Woolgar, 1997) . That is to say, it rejects the idea that we can ever have an objective account of either individual or situation because all such accounts are derived from linguistic reconstructions; they are not, in effect, transparent reproductions of the truth. Instead the approach suggests that what the situation and the leader actually are, is a consequence of various accounts and interpretations, all of which vie for domination; we only know what a leader or situation is actually like because some particular version of them has secured prominence. The relativism at the heart of the approach does not mean that all interpretations are equaland that what the leader/context is, is wholly a matter of the whim of the observer -but that some interpretations appear to be more equal than others. For example, my account of a popular individual may be that he is an incompetent charlatan, but if the popularity When the media represent leaders as villains or heroes do we really know enough about them to agree or disagree? The point of this approach, therefore, is to suggest that we may never know what the true essence of the leader or the situation actually is and must often base our actions and beliefs on the accounts of others from whom we can (re)constitute our version of events. This does not mean that leaders are simply at the hands of their followers who attribute to their leader whatever they want. It may be that leaders "fail" to deliver the charismatic performance we expect from them -but what counts as a charismatic performance is still an issue for debate. Nor does it mean that the powerful institutions that control information in our societies can promote and sustain individuals who are blatantly incompetent -though a quick look at the current crop suggests I may be completely wrong here. But it does mean we may only ever achieve an opaque account of "the truth". In terms of the leadership of change this approach suggests that the ancient study of rhetoric provides one significant element of training since it may be persuasive powers that hold the key to the successful leadership of change. Political networking, interpersonal skills, material wealth and negotiating skills are the hallmark of this approach.
It is also the case that the constructivist approach hangs another permanent question mark not only over what happened and how leaders came to be leaders, where we are and how we intend to get somewhere else etc., but also over whether what happened was inevitable or determined by circumstances of one form or another. If we can never really be certain about what happened we cannot be certain that what happened had to happen. In other words, while conventional approaches to leadership tend to assume or assert that the issues are usually transparent (we know what leader X is like, we know what the situation Y is, and we know that the result Z was the inevitable result of X leading in a Y situation), the constructivist approach embodies a degree of uncertainty that prevails over people, things, situations and results. When we move from the problem of accounting for people to the problem of accounting for nonhuman phenomena, such as machines -usually an essential element of any kind of leadership -the same kind of debates recur. Hence, what a machine is, what it will do, what its effects will be, are the upshot of specific readings of the text rather than arising directly from the essence of an unmediated or self-explanatory technology. A technology's capacity and capability is never transparently obvious and necessarily requires some form of interpretation; technology does not speak for itself but has to be spoken for. Thus our apprehension of technical capacity is the upshot of our interpreting or being persuaded that the technology will do what, for example, its producers say it will do. The crucial role of interpretation and persuasion suggests we need to attend closely to the process of interpretation rather than assuming that we are persuaded by the effectiveness of the technology. Again, this does not mean that any interpretation is as good as any other. Rather, the point is to analyse why some accounts seem more persuasive than others. Very often the most powerful accounts are those rooted in the strongest and most heterogeneous networks.
The emergence of the "truth" is sometimes represented as the outcome of a transparent reading of a text. In practice, however, the social constitution of truth is more akin to a labour of Sisyphus than Odysseus's quest: there is no "homecoming" awaiting the completion of the tasks, there is only another task; there is no single final truth, only different interpretations that construct, rather than reflect, the phenomenon. The struggle is to persuade others that one interpretation of the text is transparent; to convince them that they haven't been convinced. To sum up, the constructivist approach does not necessarily deny the importance of leadership in change. However, it does assert that an epistemological question mark hangs over all of the issues, human and non-human. Thus, whether the situation is a crisis, whether the actions of the authority figure are appropriate actions for the situation, whether acts taken by anyone are acts of "leadership" or not, and whether the technologies will do what the manufacturers say they will do, and so on, are issues that are contingent on the power of persuasive accounts and not contingent on objective or rational analysis. It suggests that leadership is essentially interwoven with acts of persuasion; it does not offer a definitive account on the ethical aspects of leadership, what a leader does, and how are we persuaded that a situation is X and that a leader should do Y in such a situation. And as I suggested, much of the persuasive power seems to derive not from individual leaders themselves but from networks of people and things. Constructivist approaches, then, supply the epistemological leg upon which the subjunctivist tripod approach stands. Let us now consider the political leg.
Indeterminacy
Indeterminacy concerns the political gap between theory and practice, that is between the issuing of orders/requests and achieving appropriate action. The orders/requests may appear perfectly logical to the leader but not necessarily to the followers; and without followers you cannot be a leader. One can see here the elective affinity between this indeterminacy and that of constructivism in its concern for the difference between the theoretical "effects" or "capacity" of technologies and its perceived "reality".
The assumption that political conflicts are an inevitable component of all organizations -and therefore that leaders should take cognisance of their inevitability -is something which many writers seem to have understood -but not many leaders. The assumption that technology is shot through with the same problem is something that few writers have even discussed. For Clausewitz (1976) , for instance, an army commander naturally and normally commanded unswerving obedience from his, or very occasionally her, troops. There was occasionally some "friction" in any military machine, either through breakdown of weapons, supplies, weather or even the troops themselves, but these were abnormal issues that could be resolved through the appropriate application of corrective techniques. For Marx (1954) , the corrosion or friction between what workers were paid to do and what they did, between labour power (theory) and labour (practice), ensured that workers' discretion remained an essential element in the so called "labour process", and remains a central element in the "labour process" approach to this day (see Grint, 1991) . Littler (1982) , for example, calls this the "central indeterminacy of capital", while Boreham (1983) applies a related notion of indeterminacy to the professions. Adopting the original Greek word, agon, meaning contest (from which we have derived the terms agonist, where one muscle is opposed by another, agony, antagonist and protagonist). Foucault (1986, pp. 208-26) , suggests that conventional power relations can be classified as "agonism", a permanent struggle between two sides in which neither side dominates (such domination for Foucault did not imply a power relationship at all). Further, Foucault (1980, p. 39) suggests that power is not a property but a relationship. That is, power is not something which you can hold or have, but rather, it is a relationship between people: "it is exercised within the social body, rather than above it." This "capillary power", then, works through us rather than upon us: we are both held in place by -and responsible for holding in place -power. Another French writer, Latour (1986) , has suggested that between the "principle" of power, or its "ostensive existence" and the "practice" of power, or its performative existence, lies this same gap. As does the distinction between power as a cause of subordinate action and power as a consequence of subordinate action: followers can almost always refuse to carry out the leader's requirements -so whether a leader has power over his or her followers depends upon the action of the followers more than the order of the leader (see Grint, 1995) . This is critical because it implies, as does the constructivist model above, that networks of power are the foundations of success. That only a sufficiently extensive network is strong enough to deter subordinates from resisting superordinates and widening the gap between theory and practice, orders and actions, demands and results. The gap is also one which Strauss (1978) talks of as facilitating "the negotiated order" of organizational existence. In sum, all of these writers recount a similar problem: between the order and the execution, between the leader's wishes and the followers' actions, there is a form of political corrosion which undermines leadership, not as an occasional, unusual or atypical event, but as a systematically recurrent problem. This does not mean that there is no relationship between what leaders want and what actually happens but it does mean that subordinates may comply with leaders' requests for their own reasons and in pursuit of their own interests and this undermines the direct link between the request and the act; the leader and the led. But if we could ensure that the political distribution of power could be determined in advance by constructing an effective and efficient network of control -that is, that we knew that all subordinates would carry out their required tasks in perfect accordance with the leader's wishes -and we could rely upon an objective analysis of the situation,
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Management Decision 36/8 [1998] 503-508 the people, the machines and so on, would we then be in a position to achieve our original goal of moving from A to B? Not if the final leg of our subjunctivist tripod is valid. For complexity theory suggests that even if the epistemological and political problems have been resolved there is still an insurmountable difficulty that relates to the temporal sequencing of events.
Complexity theory
The indeterminacy of events suggests that "despite the best laid plans of mice and men" things do have a tendency to go wrong; that we may get from A to B but it may be a very circuitous route. Yet, as complexity theory suggests ("chaos" is too pejorative a term in this situation), there are strange attractors that can provide limits to the problem. In this case the problem is not so much a political issue between leaders and followers, but the consequence of the complex interaction between many things. One hundred years before Shakespeare died, Machiavelli was writing a prescriptive account of political life that grappled not only with the problems of "corrosion" discussed above but also with the kinds of issues that complexity theorists have been worrying over 500 years later. In The Prince, Machiavelli suggests that "fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves" (1981, p. 78). Machiavelli related fortune to nature, in particular to a flood, which drives everything before it and where resistance is useless. However, were the people living near the river to take precautions to ensure proper channelling of the flood water, although the rains would not be stopped -and therefore fortune or chance remains -the channels would be able to minimize the damage caused by the river. Here, luck can determine what happens, if no precautions against luck are made. But this is a far cry from the kind of domino determinism suggested in "for the want of a nail". For Machiavelli, not only can precautions be taken to ensure an adequate supply of nails, but should the shoe be lost there is no immediate and necessary descent on to the loss of a kingdom; other blacksmiths can be trained to replace the lost shoe. So how does contemporary complexity theory relate to Machiavelli's fortune? Complexity theory implies that Machiavelli was probably right: floods are inevitable and their prediction is an inordinately complex task. However, although we cannot predict whether it will rain next week (at least we cannot in Britain), we can say that floods are more likely when a high tide is predicted and when the wettest seasons occur (since all seasons are wet!). In effect, there are "strange attractors" which delimit the likelihood of floods in August and predict them as more likely in November and March. We can therefore begin to prepare for floods by maintaining extra vigilance during these periods and by constructing fortifications where floods are most likely to occur. But it may be that constructing flood channels in one area forces the water to flood elsewhere and, ultimately, it is this problem of unforeseen consequences of action that constitutes the third leg of subjunctivism. Let us explore this a little more through complexity theory.
In complex systems it is impossible to predict the future position of any variable at a micro-level, even if there is a stability at the macro-level where "strange attractors" exist to limit the extent of macro-change. The turbulent nature of events in complex systems, however, is not just unpredictable but has an alarming multiplier effect: in the most frequently quoted example, "a butterfly stirring the air in Peking today can transform storm systems next month in New York" (Gleik, 1987: 8) . However, despite the instability of weather systems there are regular patterns underlying the instability. Thus, the weather has a consistency of temporal change that we know as the seasons. No single day's weather, at least in Britain, can be predicted because of the chaotic nature of the weather system but we can be fairly certain that most days in January in London will be colder than most days in July in New York. This regularity underlying the irregular dynamic is referred to as a "strange attractor" -it appears to set limits on the degree of complexity over time and appears to "pull" the extremes back to the norm through time. In weather terms, we can expect storms to occur at certain periods of the year and occasionally they will be both unusually ferocious and occur outside the normal stormy season, but we would not expect the storm to get exponentially worse nor for all storms to disappear forever. In other words, the system as a whole may be self-replicating but the elements of the system are chaotic. If this is an accurate reflection of reality, then leaders who assume otherwise, that is that subordinates need not be enlightened as to the direction they are heading, nor given the skills to cope with any fires that break out on the way, will rapidly find their organizations bogged down in the mass of spontaneous combustions that occur daily in most organizations. Again, the implicit suggestion here is that only a collective effort has any chance of rebutting the incessant problems facing all organizations. Networks of strange attractors that inhibit chaotic behaviour can be constructed in a variety of formats. We can, for instance, develop incentive schemes to encourage people to work in a particular way; we can build walls to deter people from running on to roads; we can provide team uniforms to galvanize teamwork. All of these act to minimalize erratic patterns of behaviour and the more systematic and varied they are, the more likely are we to ensure the organization moves in the direction intended for it. As a direct result of this, analysing causal links within complex systems becomes virtually impossible because of the chaotic relationships that exist and the way that the initial conditions generate potentially large and unpredictable variations through time -we simply cannot trace the relationship between the butterfly's wings and the storm, and it is the relationships, not the things in themselves, that are critical. One practical consequence of this lies in the critical role played by everyone in the chain of causality: unless each contribution is made in the direction and proportion required the actual result will probably not match the required result. To effect the required result, therefore, means ensuring that each contribution has the motivation and capacity to act in the appropriate direction. The greater the symmetry between the requisite actions and actual actions the more likely will it be that the strategic intent is achieved. Since subordinates usually have their own reasons for complying with the superordinate's requests (or not as the case may be), the latter will have to provide local incentives to ensure alignment between aim and result.
A second consequence is that strategy should not be about predicting the futurewhich is unpredictable by definition -but about devising methods and systems for handling the unexpected when it happens. In other words, about devolving power down to those who have to act immediately when the (predictably) unexpected happens; another gesture in the direction of networking rather than isolation as the most profitable direction for leaders to embark on. In the event, complexity is both ordered and disordered, depending upon which level you are concerned with. The achievement of any organizational objective only occurs through the activity of each and every organizational member; and this human network has to be located within a non-human network for much to happen. What these people with their machines and systems do may appear to be random at the individual level but the ultimate result of the combination of activities may be the achievement of the organizational goal. Moreover, the significance of the butterfly effect should not be underestimated since it suggests that even limited developments in one discrete area may, through the multiplier effect, result in major change. The achievement of goals is thus the result of the reconfiguration of networks of people, things and ideas -the destruction of the old and the reconstruction of the new on a (semi)permanent basis. The challenge for change leaders, therefore, is to ensure that cultures and organizations do not ossify into homogeneous concrete but remain sufficiently fluid for organizations to change. In effect, it may be that a leader's prime role is to compensate for the known tendency towards complexity by paying closer attention to individual discretion and/or by instituting systems that channel the organization towards greater stability through anti-chaotic procedures (see Gordon and Greenspan, 1994) . Alternatively, one might want to consider the way a fortuitous initial inroad into a market may be multiplied to such an extent that other allegedly "better" products are progressively driven out of the market. For example, it has been argued that VHS was technologically inferior to Betamax but that the former's initial -and initially marginal -superiority in the software market led to a ratchet-like increase in its sales over the latter. This positive "swarming" behaviour is parallel to the kind of negative panic that sets in amongst armies who, for no clear reason, appear to be beaten by a similar sized and armed force, where an initial advantage of the latter instigates a catastrophic hysteria amongst the former (see Keegan's (1976) account of the rout of the French Imperial Guard at the battle of Waterloo). Another feature of this model is that the entry of a single competitor to the market may be sufficient to disturb the entire system. Levy (1994, p. 171) , for example, suggests that Dell's mail order computer strategy forced all the competitors into a major rethink. Since, as the theory suggests, chaotic phenomena have scale invariant properties of the kind best known as Fractals, we should be able to see similar ordering properties at different levels of the same organization (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995, p. 21) . Just as Fractals look the same at whatever level one views them, so we might suggest that the fluctuation in stock prices is similar whether we consider it on an hourly, daily or yearly basis (Levy, 1994, p. 172) . If the model holds good then organizations should look remarkably familiar at all levels. However, it is also the case that even the minutest variation in conditions will generate differences across time so it is unlikely that the organization will return to any prior state. In other words, once organizations have changed it is very difficult to change them back because the entire organization will rapidly begin to acquire the new look; the change will be networked. 
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Conclusion
The survey of alternative theories suggests that subjunctivism -the essential indeterminacy of life -is a permanent feature of epistemology (constructivism), politics (indeterminacy theories) and the sequencing of events (complexity theory). In each case I have also suggested that, while these problems cannot be circumvented, they can at least be assuaged by adopting the alternative theories and by approaching the problem of change leadership as a problem of networks. Following constructivism, we may not "know" what a leader is like or what a machine will do but we can develop stronger forms of leadership by aligning leaders to heterogeneous networks of other people and things. Following indeterminacy theories, we may not be able to close the gap between what leaders want and what followers do, but the greater the strength of the network supporting the leader the more likely is that gap to remain manageable. And, following complexity theory, we may not be able to predict what will happen in the short term but we can construct networks of strange attractors that act to glue people to the direction envisaged. Isn't it about time we started "changing for the better"?
